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Albrecht Ritschl, London School of Economics
“The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign
Bond Markets, 1815–2007” by Marc Flandreau, Juan Flores, Norbert
Galliard, and Sebastián Nieto‐Parra presents new, fascinating historical
insightsintosovereignbondissues.UnderwritersuntilWorldWarIIspe-
cialized on certain default probability ranges in a case of assortative
matching: first‐rate debt would be issued by first‐rate issuing houses,
debts of slightly lower quality by second‐rate houses, and so forth. In
contrast, underwriters nowadays appear to be rather despecialized with
regard to default risk. In the old regime, the underwriting industry was
highly concentrated, whereastodayitisnot.Theauthorsalsofindthatin
the oldendays, theissuinghouses wouldassumethe riskof issue failure,
whereas today they do not. The puzzle stated by the authors is that in
the old equilibrium, the underwriter’st y p ew o u l dr e v e a lt h et y p eo f
the borrower, whereas today it does not. The interpretation given to this
evidencebythepaperisthatundertheoldregime,informationasymme-
tries existed between debtors and creditors, which the issuing houses re-
solved by signaling quality to investors. Truthful revelation of borrower
types was ensured by reputation effects. According to the authors, the
increasing role of rating agencies since the postwar period has rendered
this function of sovereign debt underwriters redundant: owing to the ac-
tivity of rating agencies, default risk is now common knowledge (or that
isatleastwhatwethoughtuntilrecently).Thedisappearanceofinforma-
tion asymmetries leaves no role for signaling and reputation effects, and
hence no role for underwriter specialization.
Thepaperconvincinglydemonstratesthatanequilibriumswitchinthe
underwriting market indeed took place in the postwar period. But is
there also a puzzle? One puzzling fact is that rating agencies appeared
already before World War I, half a century earlier than the authors’ story
would imply. If underwriters were indeed so critical in resolving infor-
mation asymmetries, their position should have been eroded earlier by
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rating agencies and the traditional underwriting business coexisted,
without undermining the assortative character of underwriter/debtor
matching that the authors’ story would imply. Hence, the underwriter
puzzle might be worse than the authors think—or is it?
The sovereign bond issue process as described by Flandreau et al. is
characterizedbyseveralstages.Inthefirst stage,adebtorentersthe mar-
ketandrevealsitstype(i.e.,itsdefaultprobability)totheunderwriters.In
the second, a match with an underwriter of the same type (i.e., special-
ized in the appropriate default probability range) is established, and the
underwriter buys up the bonds. In the third, the bonds are sold to the
market, and the debtor’s type is revealed to the public. Given the in-
formation asymmetry between debtors and the market, underwriters
will be able to extract a rent to the extent that they have controlover their
market segment.
Thisreasoninglooksfineaslongasthisgameisone‐shotforeachdebtor
and is repeated for the underwriters and the public. One‐shot debtor
participation implies that debtor types have to be evaluated every time
a bond is issued. Repeated market participation of the underwriting
houses gives rise to the desired reputation effects in signaling debtor
quality.Underrepeatedmarketparticipationofdebtors,however,debtor
types would become common knowledge after the first debt issue. This
would erode the market power of the underwriters, an effect that would
havetobeassumedawayinorderfortheauthors’storytohold.Assump-
tions that guarantee this are not entirely implausible: some debtors may
choose not to participate repeatedly, whereas others may exhibit low se-
rial correlation of debt quality. However, the principal problem with the
authors’ interpretation remains that in their setup, signals about debtor
quality are a public good, and returning borrowers could go with low‐
cost issuing houses or use other facilities. Add to this the possible role of
rating agencies in revealing debtor types in the first place, and the
authors’ story looks somewhat less than robust.
A possible alternative interpretation of the equilibrium switch
reported by the paper rests on the increasing role of international organi-
zations.PriortoWorldWarII,fewsuchorganizationsexisted,andwhere
they did, their weakness was often notorious. In this environment, issu-
ing houses were able to operate as bondholders’ gatekeepers, helping to
coordinatecreditorinterests inthe faceofdefaultthreats. Beginning with
the Bretton Woods era, international organizations have increasingly as-
sumed this role, crowding out underwriter banks from the business of
managing sovereign debt crises.
Comment 99Insummary,thisfascinatingpaperdescribesanewandimportantstyl-
izedfactaboutsovereignbondissues.Theauthors’owninterpretationof
this fact rests on information asymmetries between sovereign debtors
and investors. To this commentator, this interpretation seems less than
robust to repeated games, which would wash out the role of financial in-
termediariesinresolvingtheinformationasymmetry.Othertaskshistori-
cally performed by these underwriters, such as their coordination of
bondholder interests, might provide an alternative and more plausible
interpretation.
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